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Abstract 
 
Blockchain technology has significant potential in developing the financial services sector. Although 
blockchains are often undifferentiated in contemporary discussion, they are, in fact, divided into 
three types: public, private and consortium. Thus far, the financial services sector has focused on 
developing private and consortium blockchains while eschewing the innovative aspects of blockchain 
present in the public blockchain. Through a literature review this thesis will examine the validity of 
the issues leading to such a decision, suggest ways that the public blockchain could potentially 
innovate the financial services sector and discuss the future of public blockchains in the financial 
services sector.  
 
This thesis found that while the current reservations regarding public blockchain implementation 
are valid, new public blockchain research and solutions are increasingly rendering these reservations 
obsolete. In addition, public blockchains contain inherent advantages such as incorruptibility, 
transparency, reduction of intermediaries and increasing financial market participation over their 
more private counterparts. Although public blockchains represent a threat to the financial services 
sector’s existing revenue model, the improvements in public blockchain technology will present 
unique opportunities that will at least have to be considered by companies in the sector. In the 
meantime it seems that symbiotic private-public and consortium-public blockchain solutions will be 
adopted in the near future. 
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1 Introduction 
Blockchain technology is an important innovation that has the potential to 
revolutionize several industries, including the financial services sector (Deloitte 2018). 
Blockchain could help modernize the global banking system and lead to faster payment 
types, such as more efficient B2B transactions, lower cross-border currency exchange 
friction (Hewlett-Packard 2016), improvements in the securities trading and settlement 
process, automated clearing, enhanced security, cost reduction and direct ownership of 
holdings (Avgouleas & Kiayias 2019). In addition, blockchain could open up banking to 
the unbanked and improve financial options of retail investors (Aggarwal 2017). 
According to Santander’s InnoVentures, blockchain could save $15 to $2o billion per 
year in banks’ infrastructure costs alone (Belinky et al. 2015). The financial services 
sector is one of the first industries to be innovated by blockchain technology and many 
industry experts agree that blockchain represents a significant innovation in the field 
(Deloitte 2018). 
 
However, while we are often introduced to a blockchain that is transparent, 
decentralized, secure and immutable (Puthal et al. 2018), the financial services sector 
entities mostly focus on implementing private, or permissioned, blockchains which do 
not implement these features as extensively as public blockchains (Deloitte 2018, 
Gencer et al. 2017). The d0wnside of private blockchains is that they often remind more 
of traditional databases (Kuo Chuen 2017, Wharton 2018) and consequently forgo “the 
open architecture, the flexible trust model and the strong security guarantees” of the 
public blockchain technology (Gencer et al. 2017). Public blockchain networks are 
currently not significantly pursued in the financial services sector and they are 
generally not considered as viable tools for the financial services sector (Kruglova & 
Dolbezhkin 2018). In justification for these claims, much of public blockchain coverage 
has relied on Bitcoin, and ignored the nuances of public blockchain technology as well 
as alternative blockchains. We will analyze the rationale of these concerns and 
eventually the viability of not only Bitcoin, but also other forms of public blockchains in 
the financial services sector.  
1.1 Research objectives and research questions  
The purpose of this thesis is to research the viability of public blockchains in the 
financial services sector today and in the future. The thesis discusses the arguments 
backing the current unwillingness to adopt public blockchains in the financial sector, 
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the possible benefits of public blockchain adoption in the financial sector and the future 
of public blockchains in the financial sector. 
 
This thesis will focus on the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: How valid are the current concerns over public blockchain use in the financial 
services sector? 
 
RQ2: What would be the advantages of public blockchain implementation in the 
financial services sector? 
 
RQ3: What is the future of public blockchains in the financial services sector? 
1.2 Scope of research 
This thesis focuses on the general viability of public blockchains in the financial sector. 
The public blockchain technology is mainly discussed holistically, occasionally delving 
deeper into the specific parts of the technology.  
 
Private and consortium blockchains will be discussed insofar as to offer context and a 
point of comparison for public blockchains. We will also assume the permissioned 
blockchains are analogous to private blockchains, although some may divide the 
blockchain into further subtypes. 
 
The focus of this thesis is only on blockchain technology and will not discuss other 
distributed ledger technologies, such as the directed acyclic graph. The legal aspects of 
blockchain technology are also beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1.3 Methodology 
High quality published research papers and articles were used for the literature review 
of this thesis. A variety of scientific and reliable sources on public blockchains were 
chosen in an effort to cover the topics as objectively and as analytically as possible. 
Scientific databases such as Scopus, IEEE Xplore and Web of Science were primarily 
used. Some previous knowledge from past research work on blockchain technology was 
also utilized in the writing of this thesis. 
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1.4 Structure of the research 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will set a framework for the 
research questions and discuss the important concepts that are needed in addressing 
the thesis’ research questions. Chapter 3 will discuss the results within the framework 
of the three research questions and based on the literature gathered. Chapter 4 will 
conclude and summarize the main points of the thesis. 
2 Theoretical background 
A blockchain is a shared ledger of transactions that is stored across all the participants 
of the blockchain (OECD 2019). One of the revolutionary consequences of the 
technology is that no central party is in charge of owning or updating the information 
stored on the blockchain. Instead, identical copies of the blockchain, or the universal 
ledger, are distributed to all participants of the blockchain and the blockchain updates 
itself automatically through various mechanisms depending on the blockchain. As such, 
blockchain creates unique data capabilities that include “immutability, irreversibility, 
decentralization, persistence and anonymity” (Puthal et al. 2018). In Figure 1, we see 
how a basic currency transaction is conducted on the blockchain. It is to be noted that 
the currency represents not only money, but can also represent, for example, data, 
some sort of utility, security or ownership. However, the way these tranasction are 
conducted is the same. As seen in Figure 1, after the transaction is initiatied, it is 
broadcasted and verified by the blockchain network, or the nodes of the blockchain. 
When the transaction is verified, the transaction is added to the existing blockchain 
along with other transactions in a medium called a block. The time that it takes for the 
block to be verified is called the confirmation time. After the verification is complete, 
the currency is received by the counterparty. 
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Figure 1. How blockchain transactions work (Wild et al. 2015) 
 
2.1 What is a blockchain 
More specifically, a blockchain is a linked chain of blocks. Blocks are data storage units 
that update and upkeep data or transactions in the ledger (Yang et al. 2019). Each block 
includes a set number of individual transactions made in the same period (OECD 
2019). In addition to transaction data, each block also includes a timestamp, as well as 
a hash, or a unique identifier, and the previous block’s hash, as visualized in Figure 2 
(OECD 2019). As these blocks are linked together, they create a historical ledger with 
all conducted transactions (Hughes et al. 2019). The transactions are auditable by the 
public, but the transaction information itself stored in the blocks is encrypted and 
anonymized (Hughes et al. 2019). 
 
The validity of the transactions and data in the blocks are verified through a pre-set 
mechanism called the consensus mechanism. The mechanism seeks to maintain 
integrity of the blockchain and prevent fraud (Yang et al. 2019). The consensus 
mechanism ensures that all the nodes agree on the state of the universal ledger and a 
new block can be added on the blockchain only if all agree on the same version of the 
ledger (OECD 2019). The consensus mechanisms, however, vary according to the 
blockchain protocol, or a set of predefined rules, and blockchain type (OECD 2019).   
Generally in public blockchains, the implementation of the consensus mechanism is 
called mining (Puthal et al. 2018).  
 
A blockchain generally consists of three layers a seen in Figure 3: a protocol layer, a 
networking layer and an application layer (Demirors 2017). The protocol layer is 
programmable layer in which the rules of the blockchain are defined. The networking 
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layer is the realm in which these rules are implemented, and the application layer is the 
user-interface in which the applications are built based on the protocol and networking 
layers (Demirors 2017). 
 
 
Figure 2. The structure of blocks in a blockchain (Prashanth Joshi et al. 2018) 
 
 
Figure 3. The different layers of a blockchain (Demirors 2017) 
 
2.2 Smart contracts 
The first application of blockchain technology, Bitcoin, was developed for peer-to-peer 
electronic cash transactions by Satoshi Nakamoto (2008). However the Ethereum 
blockchain introduced another revolutionary feature called the smart contract. Smart 
contracts are programmable and self-executing contracts based on pre-determined 
conditions (Ahl 2019, Frankefield 2019). These contracts have important potential in 
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the financial services sector because they allow an asset or a currency to be transferred 
into a program (Bheemaiah 2017). To initiate smart contract transactions, tokens are 
needed. Ethereum uses a token standard called ERC-20, but other token standard 
variations exist. 
2.3 Differences between public, private and consortium 
blockchains 
The implementation of a given blockchain not only depends on different protocols, but 
also on different blockchain types. The three types of blockchains are public, private 
and consortium (Kuo Chuen 2017). These three types have various levels of 
decentralization as seen in Figure 4. The public blockchain is arguably a blockchain in 
its purest form, adhering most closely to Puthal’s (2018) aforementioned blockchain 
capabilities, especially immutability and decentralization. In theory, anyone can access 
a public blockchain, as well as participate in the consensus mechanism (Hughes et al. 
2019). The transactions on the public blockchain are conducted using tokens. The 
OECD (2019) characterizes these tokens into payment tokens, utility tokens and 
security tokens. They store value, represent a right to a good and represent equity 
respectively (OECD 2019). As there is no central authority to maintain the validity of 
the blockchain, a decentralized consensus mechanism is used (Puthal et al. 2018). The 
consensus mechanism used in public blockchains vary, but the most notable ones are 
Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) (Puthal et al. 2018).  
 
On the other hand, the private blockchain is the most centralized blockchain type and 
its functionality does not drastically differ from that of traditional databases (Kuo 
Chuen 2017). Private blockchains are regulated blockchains in which only permissioned 
individuals and groups have access to and can contribute to the blockchain (Kuo Chuen 
2017). A trusted authority, node or nodes, is in charge of maintaining the integrity of 
the blockchain (Puthal et al. 2018). Essentially, in private blockchains, only this trusted 
authority can validate and confirm transactions (van Deventer et al. 2018). Because a 
single entity is in charge of maintaining the integrity of the blockchain, private 
blockchains can use much simpler and faster consensus mechanisms (Guegan  2017). 
However, the centralized nature of private blockchains means that they are not 
immutable and can be reversed by permissioned authorities. The centralization also 
makes the blockchain susceptible to the risks of traditional database management, as 
there exists a central point of attack for hackers to exploit (Guegan 2017, Lindsey 
2018). Additionally, private blockchain consensus mechanisms do not necessarily use 
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cryptography, making them arguably less secure than public blockchains (Guegan 
2017).  
 
The consortium blockchain is a hybrid blockchain that combines the features of the 
private and the public blockchain (Kuo Chuen 2017). Consortium blockchains are 
partially centralized and managed by selected validator nodes (Kuo Chuen 2017). 
Similarly to private blockchains, consortium blockchains rely on “voting or multi-party 
consensus algorithms” for maintaining the integrity of the blockchain (Mao et al. 2018).  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Representation of private, consortium and public blockchains (Points 
represent nodes) (Evans 2015) 
3 Review of the literature on public blockchain use in the 
financial services sector 
The results are addressed from the point of view of this thesis’ three research questions. 
Sections 4.1-4.3 discuss RQ1: How valid are the current concerns over public 
blockchain use in the financial services sector? Section 4.4 discusses RQ2: What would 
be the advantages of public blockchain implementation in the financial services sector? 
Section 4.5 discusses RQ3: What is the future of public blockchains in the financial 
services sector? 
3.1 The Blockchain Consensus Dilemma 
Before it is feasible for the financial services industry to adopt public blockchains, the 
issues with public blockchains’ consensus mechanisms have to be addressed. While the 
consensus mechanisms for private blockchains are quick and sustainable, due to their 
inherent centralization, the mechanisms for the most notable public blockchains such 
as Bitcoin, Litecoin and Ethereum have been often criticized for their energy use and 
long-term unsoundness (Frankenfield 2018). The original consensus mechanism for 
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public blockchains, the Proof-of-Work (PoW), is still used by the most popular 
blockchains (Frankenfield 2018). PoW relies on solving complex mathematical puzzles 
by the miners, or validators of the network (Kulhari 2018). The miners, in turn, receive 
a reward for their validating efforts in the form of cryptocurrency, or the transaction 
tokens of blockchains. While the PoW mechanism creates unique security advantages, 
it is criticized for its energy consumption, the ability for the blockchain network to be 
attacked if 51% of the mining power is controlled by a malevolent entity and the 
decreasing incentive for the miners to mine due to decreasing rewards received for each 
verified block (Auer 2019). Indeed, in 2017, Bitcoin used more power than many 
nations (Blinder 2018), and the blockchains that use the PoW are not as impervious to 
blockchain network attacks as previously thought (Frankenfield 2018). Moreover, 
Bitcoin mining is not as decentralized as often assumed, since the five biggest Bitcoin 
mining pools, or groups of collaborating miners, currently control more than 51% of the 
mining power (Zheng et al. 2017, Tuwiner 2019).  
 
However, there are alternative consensus mechanisms that do not require any 
significant energy consumption and rely on very different types of mining (Kulhari 
2018). One of these alternative mechanisms is the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanism 
(Kulhari 2018). Blockchains such as Cardano, Nxt already use this mechanism, while 
Ethereum is in the process of switching from the PoW to the PoS mechanism (Auer 
2019). Instead of cryptographic hashing, the mechanism relies on validating the 
blockchain through a process called staking (Kulhari 2018). In addition to saving 
energy, the PoS mechanism disincentivizes the 51% attack as the attacker would suffer 
oneself from a fall in the value of the blockchain associated with a malicious attack 
(Frankenfield 2018). However, the PoS mechanism is not beyond criticism either. Auer 
posits (2019) that PoS contains no efficient method when distinguishing between two 
blockchains with alternative histories, which opens it up for fraudulent betting on 
alternative blockchain histories. Whereas the PoW mechanism resolves such a problem 
by choosing the longest chain, no such tangible criterion exists for the PoS mechanism 
(Auer 2019). Auer (2019) also argues that alternative consensus mechanisms such as 
the Proof-of-Stake, Delegated Proof-of-Stake and Proof-of-Importance can only 
succeed if a degree of institutionalization and thus centralization is present (Auer 
2019). Such presence of centralization undermines the value of decentralization and 
exposes such blockchains to some of the very same shortcomings that the private 
blockchains face. 
 
Finally, while the public consensus mechanism is one of the revolutionary aspects of 
blockchain technology it also creates problems that are solved rather simply under the 
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private blockchains. For instance, in the past, Bitcoin has not been able to improve 
performance “because the miners could not reach consensus on how to improve the 
algorithm” and the Ethereum blockchain has been split into two separate blockchains 
over disagreement on how to proceed after a hack on its smart contracts (Jun 2018). As 
a result, the public blockchain consensus mechanisms make public blockchain 
operation slower and less scalable, which is an important consideration for the 
financial services sector. 
 
3.2 Scalability issues 
The speed of transactions is a key consideration for companies in the financial services 
sector, however, the biggest and arguably most trusted public blockchains, Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, remain very slow as they can process only 4.6 and 9 transactions per second 
respectively, versus Visa’s approximate 1,700 transactions per second (Jun 2018, Li  
2019). While the daily transaction volume on public blockchains keeps developing 
upward and the scalability issue is not solved, transaction times will increase and 
become more expensive as seen in Figure 5 (Auer 2019). In the figure, the supply curve 
represents the amount, which tends to be constant, of transactions that can be 
processed at any given time on the blockchain. Because the supply is constant, 
increased demand not only slows down the average rate at which the consumers can 
conduct their transactions on the blockchain, but increases the transaction fees as well. 
As these networks grow, by virtue of being accessible to everyone, public blockchains 
become slower and more expensive to use (Auer 2019). While the biggest and most 
trusted blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum are currently not viable options for 
frequent day-to-day transactions due to their slow transaction speed, there are ways 
blockchains can improve this speed through solutions such as second blockchain layers, 
sharding and alternative consensus mechanisms (Auer 2019). These are explained next. 
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Figure 5. Blockchain network congestion (Auer 2019) 
 
One of the proposed solutions for blockchain scalability and higher transaction speed 
has been to shift blockchains from the currently dominating single chain solution to a 
multi-chain architecture (Yu et al. 2019). One way to achieve this architecture is 
through an off-chain protocol such as Bitcoin’s Lightning Network (Zhong et al. 2019). 
The network uses sub-chains independent from the main blockchain to handle the 
details of transactions. Only final outcomes of the sub-chains are then committed to the 
main blockchain (Yu et al. 2019). This significantly reduces the capacity pressure of the 
blockchain, however, critics state that these off-chain payment systems can support at 
most 800 million users and are in contradiction with the principles of blockchain as the 
off-chain transactions cannot be validated by the public (Yu et al. 2019, Zhong et al. 
2019).  
 
Another proposed solution to the scalability problem is a mechanism called sharding. 
In January 2019, the Zilliqa blockchain was the first blockchain to implement sharding 
(Baker 2019). Other public blockchains, such as Ethereum, are seeking do so in the 
near future. In the current public blockchain protocols, each node of the blockchain 
network is responsible for storing the entire history of the blockchain and processing all 
the transactions on the blockchain. Sharding proposes that the blockchain should be 
divided into smaller divisions called shards and that each shard would be verified by 
only some of the nodes in the blockchain, as seen in Figure 6 (Chauhan et al. 2018, 
Zamani et al. 2018). This would allow many transactions to be processed in parallel, 
instead of linearly, leading to less computing and storage per node, thus faster 
performance, faster transaction times and better scalability of the blockchain to larger 
networks (Chauhan et al. 2018, Zamani et al. 2018). As a result of sharding, the 
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aforementioned Zilliqa can conduct 2,828 transactions per second versus the existing 
public blockchain average of 7-15 transactions (Zilliqa 2019). However, some argue that 
sharding poses certain security concerns such as the single-shard takeover attack 
(Chauhan et al. 2018). Some other drawbacks of sharding include the added complexity 
that is needed to handle the transactions between different shards and the decreased 
blockchain decentralization as the number of shards increase (Fanti & Viswanath 
2019). 
 
Some public blockchain protocols inherently support fast blockchain transactions as a 
result of their consensus mechanism. One example of this is the EOS.IO blockchain 
which can scale up to 100,000 transactions per second (Chauhan et al. 2018). It uses a 
variation of the aforementioned Proof-of-Stake consensus mechanism, called Delegated 
Proof-of-Stake (DPoS). In the DPoS consensus mechanism, the blockchain “token 
holders select the block producers by continuous voting procedure” (Chauhan et al. 
2018). Consequently, less time is needed to produce a new block by a single producer 
and a given transaction on the EOS blockchain will be confirmed within 1.5 seconds 
with a 99.9% certainty (Chauhan et al. 2018). On the other hand, the DPoS mechanism 
paves the way for centralization as, in practice, it does not allow regular users to audit 
the blockchain (Chauhan et al. 2018).  
 
Overall, the current concerns regarding public blockchain scalability are realistic and 
especially the low speed of transactions is a considerable limitation for public 
blockchain use-cases in the financial services sector. However, although the 
performance enhancements are still at their infancy, public blockchain performance 
will certainly increase in the future with more research and time (Jun 2018).   
 
  
Figure 6. Current validation structure versus sharding (Imbrex 2017) 
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3.3 Privacy, Security, and Practical Concerns 
One of the strongest motives for the financial services sector’s willingness to operate on 
private and not public blockchains, is the inherent lack of data privacy in current 
implementations of most public blockchains. The financial services sector relies on 
private data “such as personal identity (sex, age, name, address and etc.), health record, 
private keys, or ownership of assets” yet most public blockchains are open-source 
(Victor 2019) and operate under the protocol of transparency (Jun 2018). It has been 
found that even though transactions on the Bitcoin and other public blockchains are 
anonymous, the identity of the transaction initiator can be determined if enough data is 
gathered about the initiator (Kruglova & Dolbezhkin 2018, Goldfeder 2017). Thus, 
including private data on public blockchains is currently not entirely safe and even 
somewhat unrealistic.  
 
However, a solution to this problem may have already been discovered with 
cryptographic algorithms such as the zero-knowledge-proof (Jun 2018). It has already 
been implemented in privacy-centric blockchain projects such as Zcash, which supports 
private transactions “where sender, receiver and amount are not revealed; and yet, an 
outside observer can still distinguish between a valid and non-valid transaction” (Bowe 
et al. 2019). However, the downside of these privacy features is increased 
computational time (Dib et al. 2018). Further development is needed to reach an 
optimal level of privacy with a great transactional speed. 
 
There are also security and practical concerns that need to be addressed before the 
financial services sector can further explore the possibilities of public blockchains 
(Kruglova & Dolbezhkin 2018). Despite the inherent security public blockchains 
provide, there is still a concern over loopholes in the blockchain code, as the DAO 
attack on Ethereum went to show, and over a secure ways to store large quantities of 
blockchain tokens or cryptocurrencies (Kruglova & Dolbezhkin 2018, Jun 2018). 
Furthermore, in part because trading of these cryptocurrencies is open to all, their price 
has been extremely volatile (Kjærland et al. 2018). This is a significant hinderance to 
the day-to-day reliability of the public blockchain, as among other things, it makes 
financial modelling and forecasting based on blockchain transactions difficult. 
However, it is to be noted that Bitcoin’s price volatility has displayed a decreasing trend 
over the past seven years (Bitcoin Volatility Index 2019). 
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3.4 The advantages of public blockchain implementation 
One of the main advantages of public blockchains is the incorruptibility that their 
complete decentralization provides. Complete decentralization protects “the users of an 
application from the developers by establishing that there are certain things that even 
the developers of an application have no authority to do” (Buterin 2015). We could 
imagine that this could bring financial stability and even certainty to financial service 
operators in politically unstable countries. In theory, these operators could not be 
coerced to change their blockchain protocols to serve, for example, an oppressive 
political regime. This could also make subsidiary activity safer in such countries. 
Overall, the decentralization of the blockchain governing structure paired with the 
absence of a central point of attack for hackers to target (Lindsey 2018) would make 
financial services operation more secure in less stable environments. 
 
In addition, relinquishing centralized control in favor of the public blockchain could 
improve financial institutions’ perceived public image through increased transparency. 
A YouGov survey found that 66% of adults in Britain still do not think that banks have 
society’s best interests in mind (White 2018) while a Facebook IQ (2016) survey 
revealed that only 8% of millennials trust financial institutions. Private and consortium 
blockchains still allow the protocol of the blockchain to be modified by authorized 
members, namely these same institutions for whom the public has little trust. Giving up 
some control may be a way to regain the public’s confidence the financial services 
sector lost after the last financial crisis. 
 
Reduction of intermediaries is another advantage public blockchains have over private, 
and even consortium, blockchains. As the public blockchain is open to everyone and is 
used by a wide range of assets, it facilitates network effects and financial freedom 
unavailable to private, or even consortium, blockchains (Buterin 2015). For example, 
one can send Bitcoin anywhere in the world regardless of bank holidays and merchants 
can expand to areas where credit cards are not available (Davradakis & Santos 2019). 
Regarding transactions that previously used third parties to manage counterparty risk, 
the public blockchain is able to reduce and stabilize fees for these, regardless of how 
much money is transacted (Davradakis & Santos 2019, Buterin 2015). Another 
important consequence is that anyone can issue and purchase an asset on the public 
blockchain. As a result, this reduces cost and complexity of listing a company, which 
decreases the barriers to entry to the financial markets (Hays & Valek 2019). 
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Public blockchains are uniquely opening up the financial markets to new participants, 
especially to retail investors as well as small and medium-sized enterprises (Hays & 
Valek 2019). In addition to opening up fundraising to smaller companies, public 
blockchain technology has the potential to increase the liquidity of primary and 
secondary markets. The most promising development in this field is the securities 
token offerings (STOs). The STOs are a new way for companies to raise funds by 
converting securities into asset-backed blockchain tokens (Browne 2019). While both 
private and public blockchains are pursuing this innovation, the public version of the 
STOs has the potential to truly democratize retail investors’ access to the capital 
markets, create a larger pool of investors, increase market transparency, increase 
liquidity and speed as well as offer around the clock trading (Chester 2019). Thus far, 
there have been promising public blockchain STO projects. One of them is Polymath, 
which has developed a new blockchain token standard called the ST-20 (Polymath 
2019). The ST-20 is an extension of Ethereum’s ERC-20 token used for smart contracts 
and introduces an additional functionality that allows transfers of blockchain tokens to 
be restricted, which allows the tokens to comply with securities trading regulations 
(Polymath 2019). While this is perhaps a divergence from a purely public blockchain, as 
these tokens are not accessible to anyone due to restrictions dictated by securities 
trading regulations, it accomplishes many of the touted benefits of public STOs: it 
makes securities trading more accessible to the unbanked, enables 24/7 access to 
markets and allows companies to customize their equities issues through 
programmable code (Polymath 2019). Specifically, the propositions to increase 
liquidity, equity customization, speed and decreasing settlement times are something 
the financial services sector could greatly benefit from. The potential of digitized assets 
on the blockchain will inevitably be explored further in the future. Whether this will 
continue to thrive on the public or the private blockchain, remains to be seen. 
 
The possibilities of decentralized blockchains are slowly starting to be realized by the  
innovators of the financial services sector. For example, the subsidiary of Société 
Générale, the 16th largest bank in the world, issued €1oo million in covered bonds in 
April 2019 onto Ethereum’s public blockchain (Société Générale 2019). This was a 
significant milestone as it was the first large financial services institution to create an 
STO on a public blockchain. In its own words, the bank was motivated by increased 
product scalability, computer code automation and reduced time to market, which 
would improve transferability and settlement of the bonds (Société Générale 2019). 
Significantly, the credit rating agency Moody’s agrees that the use of blockchain has a 
positive effect on the credit rating, due to the increased transparency and decreased 
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intermediaries, both strengths of public blockchains, compared to the traditional bond 
issuing mechanism (Baydakova 2019, Moody’s 2018). 
 
However, due to the prevailing business model in the financial services sector, adopting 
the public blockchain could actually hurt many players in the financial services sector. 
In addition to decreasing company-specific control, Moody’s (2018) states that the 
decentralization aspect of public blockchains will cause a pressure on revenue due to 
decreased processing fees, commissions and gains on foreign exchange transactions. 
Many banks still rely heavily on fees and commissions (Moody’s 2018). Thus, truly 
accepting a decentralized blockchain would require a more fundamental change to the 
financial services sector’s business model and the discovery of new revenue streams 
(Deloitte 2018). As it stands, it is unlikely that big players in the industry will promote 
significant upheaval to the system that has been advantageous so far. 
3.5 The future of public blockchains in the financial services sector 
Currently the financial services industry is relying on consortium blockchains, not 
public blockchains, to capture the benefits of the technology, due to a desire for 
complete operational certainty and speed. It seems that the public blockchain space is 
more compelling to small, even subversive, companies and startups in the financial 
services sector. Bigger enterprises seek to maintain the current framework by creating 
consortium blockchain networks that retain their current leadership status in the 
sector. Deloitte (2018), for instance, divides the financial services sector companies into 
the more traditional enterprises and the more innovative emerging disruptors.  
 
The lines between public and consortium blockchains are starting to diminish. The 
consortium blockchains are becoming bigger with increasing memberships. According 
to Deloitte’s (2018) global survey, 29% are already a part of consortium blockchain and 
45% are likely to join one. On the other hand, public blockchains are creating private 
implementations for corporations. For example, J.P. Morgan Chase’s Quorum 
consortium blockchain is built on Ethereum’s public blockchain (J.P. Morgan 2019). 
Both blockchain types seek to increasingly capture the benefits of the other type. It is 
likely that synergetic consortium-public and private-public blockchain structures, 
represented in Figure 7, will be increasingly common. 
 
It is evident that the financial services sector will keep building on consortium 
blockchains due to their advantages in key categories like privacy and scaling, however, 
some are questioning the innovation of consortium blockchains (Dib et al. 2018). While 
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these blockchains will undoubtedly improve the speed and ease of transactions in the 
financial services sector, consortium networks may create barriers to entry, cause 
uneven power distribution within the consortium and may even hamper innovation 
(Dib et al. 2018). The uneven power distribution is inherent in the consortium 
blockchain membership structure. They are divided into premium and general 
members, who pay $250,000 and $5,000 to $50,000, respectively, per year in 
membership fees (Irrera 2017). Many consortium blockchains have also ran into 
cooperation problems among the consortium members as well as funding problems, 
which explains why several big companies, such as J.P. Morgan Chase, have left 
consortiums and joined others or created their own (Irrera 2017). In this context, well-
developed public blockchains have the advantage of having had constant development 
and a well-defined modus operandi. Thus, due to the relatively untested nature of 
consortium blockchains, it remains to be seen whether these will bring about 
revolutionary innovation in the financial services sector, or whether they will succumb 
to their weaknesses and shift industry interest toward public blockchain 
implementation. 
  
On the face of it, the public-consortium blockchain debate draws comparisons to 
Harvard Professor Clayton Christensen’s Disruptive Innovation theory. According to 
the theory, existing market leaders unwillingly lose market share and are eventually 
overcome by a disruptive innovation. Disruptive innovation is defined as something 
that “allows a whole new population of consumers at the bottom of a market access to a 
product or service that was historically only accessible to consumers with a lot of 
money or a lot of skill“ (Christensen 2019). Significantly, this innovation strongly 
reminds of public blockchains’ goal of democratizing the financial markets and 
empowering the marginalized, through developments such as the STO and low-
commission money transfers. While in reality the narrative is not as straightforward, 
public blockchains tend to represent complete reorganization of the financial services 
sector, while consortium blockchains represent an improvement of the existing 
paradigm.  
 
Currently, using public blockchains for day-to-day operations is still not entirely viable, 
however, with each improvement public blockchains are showing increasing potential 
to disrupt the financial services sector as a whole. In the future, the viability of public 
blockchain use in the sector will be linked to the blockchain’s ability to improve its 
operability and the ability of the sector to recognize the benefits that public blockchain 
technology provides. Moreover, as it took a long time for companies to adopt first 
private, then consortium blockchains, similarly it will take time for the financial 
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services sector to build confidence for the relatively untested public blockchain. It will 
take a compelling use-case and a successful large-scale implementation of the 
technology, for momentum to start building. That being said, it appears that, even 
today, there could be a place for both blockchains. As discussed, private blockchains are 
currently better suited for internal and the more data sensitive operations, while public 
blockchains are valuable in a supplementary capacity in areas where intermediaries are 
untrustworthy or non-existent, such as in politically unstable countries, in areas where 
intermediaries may want to be minimized, such as international money transfers, and 
in areas where network effects want to be maximized. Thus, it is likely that in the near 
future we will be moving increasingly toward public-private and public-consortium 
blockchain collaboration. 
 
 
Figure 7. Possible private-public blockchain symbiosis (Ali et al. 2018) 
4 Discussion and conclusions  
We started this thesis with three research questions: How valid are the current 
concerns over public blockchain use in the financial services sector, what would be the 
advantages of public blockchain implementation in the financial services sector 
and what is the future of public blockchains in the financial services sector? 
 
Through a literature review we distinguished the most pertinent concerns with public 
blockchains regarding financial services sector implementation. The first concern is the 
demanding and slow consensus mechanisms. This is a valid concern in that the Proof-
of-Work consensus mechanism is slow, energy intensive and susceptible to network 
takeovers. We found, however, that there are alternative consensus mechanisms such 
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as the Proof-of-Stake and Delegated Proof-of-Stake that are faster and less energy 
intensive than the Proof-of-Work, yet these too have shortcomings.  
 
The second concern with public blockchains is scalability. We found that scalability of 
public blockchains needs to be improved in order to prevent network congestion and 
slower transaction speeds. Before this is done, significant adoption by the financial 
services sector is unrealistic. There is currently promising research on the matter and 
possible solutions to the problem are already being implemented.  
 
The third major concern with public blockchains is the lack of privacy. Public 
blockchains are severely disadvantaged in comparison to private blockchains in this 
category. However, new privacy enhancing algorithms, such as the zero-knowledge-
proof are in the process of mending the situation. Despite their promise, these too need 
further development, as increased privacy on public blockchains decreases transaction 
speed, something crucial to the financial services sector. Overall, the current concerns 
with public blockchains are valid, but are becoming less obvious with new research and 
constant development. 
 
Despite the shortcomings of public blockchains, they offer unique advantages over 
private blockchains. Public blockchains offer a uniquely transparent way of governing 
companies that may benefit the public image of financial services sector companies. 
Public blockchains also entirely dispose of intermediaries, which promotes even greater 
network effects than those of consortium chains, increases transaction efficiency and 
lowers transaction costs. Public blockchains also have the potential to streamline the 
securities markets, create more liquid financial markets and provide new financial 
opportunities where they did not exist before, with developments such as the STOs. A 
few players in the financial services sector, have recognized the potential of public 
blockchains in streamlining the securities markets, but we are still far away from the 
widespread acceptance of these benefits. Crucially, the financial services sector’s 
current reliance on fee-based revenue streams means that several of the public 
blockchain benefits may actually hurt existing companies in the sector. 
 
Finally, we established that the aforementioned shortcomings of public blockchains 
place them currently at a disadvantage relative to consortium blockchains in the 
financial services sector. However, public blockchains have the potential to 
revolutionize the sector a step beyond consortium blockchains. Moving forward, public 
blockchains will continue to improve their main shortcomings: energy efficiency, 
scalability, transaction speed and privacy management. This should increase interest in 
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public blockchain implementations in the financial services sector. However, one of the 
biggest problem with public blockchains is that they represent a complete remodeling 
of the financial services sector, which may be a concern for the major players who do 
not want to risk losing influence in the industry. Thus, public blockchain viability will 
largely depend on the financial services sector’s desire to innovate and to remodel itself. 
In the meantime, synergetic solutions between private, consortium and public 
blockchains are likely to be pursued. 
4.1 Implications to practice 
This thesis reveals several practical implications to the financial services sector and 
public blockchains. First, despite the attraction of private and consortium blockchains, 
companies should try to pursue, arguably blockchain technology’s greatest strength, 
decentralization. While the more private blockchains offer greater speeds there is more 
potential to be drawn from blockchain technology as a whole than just that.  
 
Second, even the biggest institutions in the financial services sector should be vigilant 
about the possible changes to the sector. While public blockchain implementation in 
the sector has an uncertain future, historically many small innovators in various fields 
have undercut the market share of, and even displaced, many established players in 
these fields. Thus, the entire sector has a vested interest in keeping up to date with 
public blockchain innovation. 
4.2 Suggestions for future research 
In part due to the novelty of the topic, surprisingly little differentiation exists in 
research between public, consortium and private blockchains in current research. The 
three types are often lumped together in current blockchain technology discussion 
despite offering distinct value propositions and having different requirements. More 
research differentiating these three is needed. As research has established a relatively 
strong case for the use blockchain, we are increasingly shifting from the question of 
whether blockchain should be used to what kind of blockchain should be used. More 
clear differentiation of these three blockchain types would help us answer that 
question. 
 
Limited research was found on public blockchains’ implementation, in practice, in the 
financial services sector. Some of the earlier research on Bitcoin discounted the 
technology as impractical for the financial services sector, however much has changed 
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since then. Even with Société Générale’s first steps into public blockchain 
implementation for bond issues, research has been left notably outdated on public 
blockchain use in the financial services sector. Consequently, a large part of the 
information on current developments came from news outlets and not academic 
papers. As we update our knowledge on public blockchains, further research should be 
conducted to reflect these changes. Moreover, the majority of research still focuses on 
Bitcoin, and to a lesser extent, Ethereum. Additional in-depth research on other public 
blockchains would be beneficial, as it would give an insight into the different ways to 
structure public blockchains.  
 
The interoperability of public blockchains and cryptocurrency volatility mitigation 
should also be researched, as public blockchains’ success in the financial services sector 
heavily depends on their scalability and practicality. For example, it would be 
interesting to research whether the high volatility of cryptocurrencies could be 
counteracted in day-to-day operations via some form of indexing, or other means, 
assuming cryptocurrency volatility will not abate. 
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